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LAWYERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE COURT:
ISSUES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT*
YORIHIKo KUMASAKA**

and RAJ K.

GUPTAt

Complete agreement in any dialogue between psychiatrists and
lawyers can hardly be expected, even if they are successful in communicating their viewpoints to each other. In any issue on civil commitment of the mentally ill, the price of disrupted communication, or
a lack of communication, between lawyers and psychiatrists which results in unnecessary confrontation or premature compromise, is paid by
the patient whose needs might otherwise have been handled differently.
What is needed for better communication is a recognition and an understanding by each of the modes of thinking and analysis of the other.
In September, 1965, revisions of the Mental Hygiene Law concerning hospitalization of the mentally ill' went into effect in New
York. Since then, a group of lawyers specializing in the psychiatric
field has been formed in that state. These lawyers, full-time employees
of the Mental Health Information Service (MHIS) of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, are assigned to psychiatric hospitals
in New York City and surrounding areas. They render free legal
services to patients faced with hospitalization.2 The staff attorneys of
the MHIS of the First Judicial Department also represent these civil
patients at any court hearings held concerning hospitalization. 3 In the
First )epnrtmen+, seven -r :ht attoiiieys from the M-ilS are always
* This work was supported by Public Health Service Grant MH 16485 from
the National Institute of Mental Health. The materials on which this article is
based (see note 10 infra) are on file under this grant number at the National Institute
of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland.
** Research Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Study Director, Hospitalization Research Unit, Department of Psychiatry, New York University Medical Center.

M.D., Chiba University, 1955.
t Staff Attorney, Hospitalization Research Unit, Department of Psychiatry,
New York University Medical Center. B. Com., 1962, LL.B., 1964, LL.M., 1966, Delhi

University; M.C.L., 1967, Columbia University; LL.M., 1968, New York University.
1. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 70-88 (McKinney 1971).

2. For administrative purposes the State of New York is divided into four
judicial departments. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 70 (McKinney 1968). The Mental
Health Information Service (MHIS), established pursuant to N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW § 88 (McKinney 1971), is similarly divided into four judicial departments. Only

in its First and Second Departments is the MHIS staffed by lawyers. In the Third
and Fourth Departments, the MHIS is staffed primarily by social workers.
3. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 60-61 (1967). In the
other departments, the courts appoint public counsel for indigent patients. N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAW §§ 35(1) (a),

§ 606.1(a) (2) (McKinney 1971).

(2)

(McKinney

1968).

See N.Y.

COURT RULES
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present at the Psychiatric Division of Bellevue Hospital in Manhattan.
At Bellevue, aUl patients who request a court hearing to contest the
recommendation of two Bellevue psychiatrists for further hospitalization" are either represented or assisted by these "specialized" lawyers
in the mental health field. The encounters between lawyers and psychiatrists at Bellevue court hearings provided the authors with a natural
"experimental" setting in which to examine the basic issues of conflict
and differences in reasoning between lawyers and psychiatrists dealing
with hospitalization of the mentally ill, with special reference to the
issue of "dangerousness."
METHOD OF STUDY

The authors obtained the court records for all civil commitment
hearings held over a period of nine months at the courtroom in
Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital. During this period, sixty hearings,
involving fifty-five patients, were held. The court record for each of
these cases consisted of the hearing transcript, a two-physician certificate (two-PC) 5 and the written report to the court by MHIS lawyers.'
The two-PC contains a brief description of events leading to
hospitalization, mental status, diagnosis and limited demographic information, such as age, sex, race and religion. The form filled out by
the physicians also seeks answers to the questions of whether a patient
had demonstrated a "tendency to injure himself" and "to injure others."
In practically all cases, the answer is a routine "possibly" or "probably."
Psychiatrists themselves frequently disregard these answers in their
testimony in later hearings.
In contrast to the medical certificate, the MHIS report gives a
fairly detailed description of events leading to hospitalization and other
background facts, relying partly on hospital records and partly on
independent inquiries. The report specifically deals with the issue of
"dangerousness," but usually employs a similar stock answer: "There
4. The extended hospitalization is almost always at a state hospital.

5.The two-PC is a certification by two examining physicians which accompanies any application filed by a family or a hospital administrator for the admission
of a person alleged to be mentally ill. The certificate states that the person sought
to be hospitalized is mentally ill and "suitable for care and treatment" in a hospital.
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72(1) (McKinney 1971).
6. Under the rules promulgated by the Presiding Justice of the Appellate
Division of the First Judicial Department, the Director of the MHIS is required
to submit such reports to the court in every case. The report contains a summary of
the patient's hospital record and results of interviews by the MHIS with the patient
and others having information relevant to the patient's case. 22 N.Y. CODE, RULES
AND REGULATIONS § 622.2(a).
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is no indication in the hospital record nor is there any evidence that
the patient is assaultive or suicidal."
The usual participants in a hearing are the judge, the MHIS
lawyer, a Bellevue staff psychiatrist, who is usually one of the two
certifying psychiatrists on the two-PC, and the patient. Other participants may be family members, friends, private lawyers and independent psychiatrists appointed by the court to give independent medical opinions.7 Hearings are generally informal and vary in length depending on the problems presented.' The dialogue between a lawyer
and a psychiatrist usually follows the psychiatrist's direct testimony
and takes the form of cross-examination. Therefore, in order to ascertain the opinions and views of the lawyers, one would have to analyze
their questions to the psychiatrists and the direction of their crossexamination. The lawyers occasionally reveal themselves as well either
spontaneously or upon questioning by the judge.
The authors submitted the court records for each of the fifty-five
cases to two independent analysts. Our goal was to determine the
issues - the points of conflict - between the professional participants
7. In the hearings that formed the basis for this study, sixty-three professionals
participated: twenty-five judges, eight MHIS lawyers, four private attorneys, twentyfour Bellevue staff psychiatrists and two independent psychiatrists.
8. Previous studies on court hearings pertaining to the civil commitment of the
mentally ill have indicated that the hearings rarely take place, and when they do, they
are usually of very short duration. R. Rocx, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 154 (1968) (5 minutes on the average); Scheff, Social Condition
for Rationality: How Urban and Rural Courts Deal with the Mentally Ill, AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Mar., 1964, at 22 (1.6 minutes) ; Wenger & Fletcher, The
Effect of Legal Counsel and Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: A Confrontation
of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 66 (1969)
(8.13 minutes).
Furthermore, they tend to be routine and ritualistic, and are "merely a review of the
decision of the hospital staff." Rock, supra, at 198.
When the New York legislature revised the Mental Hygiene Law, it did not
really intend to increase the number of court hearings but to make them more meaningful. However, implementation of the new law has differed from hospital to hospital.
Most state hospitals designate the psychiatrist who is to testify; the hospital is
represented by an attorney from the State Attorney General's office. On the patient's
side, the MHIS lawyers or non-lawyer officers in all four judicial departments
routinely submit their written reports to the courts, but do not always represent
patients at hearings. Except in the First Department, where the MHIS lawyers
also represent the patients in court, a court-appointed lawyer represents the patient
unless he has a private lawyer. See Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information
Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405 (1971) ; Zitrin,
Herman & Kumasaka, New York's Mental Hygiene Law - A Preliminary Evaluation,
54 MENTAL HYGIENE 28

(1970).

At Bellevue, hearings last an average of 16.4 minutes. One of the two certifying psychiatrists on the two-PC usually testifies in the court, the hospital is not represented by a lawyer and the psychiatrist is cross-examined by the MHIS lawyer who
represents the patient.
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at the hearings, and to abstract the nature of their reasoning from the
content of their written and oral testimony. Since the process involved
judgment, we realized that our findings might potentially be influenced
by the personal and professional orientation of the analysts. We nevertheless chose analysts familiar with the matter of civil commitment
of the mentally ill, who had sufficient knowledge in the field that they
would concentrate on the basic problems and not emphasize peripheral
ones. The analysts chosen were a lawyer and a psychiatrist, both of
whom maintain an academic interest in the field and are impartial
insofar as the court hearings at Bellevue are concerned.' Both the
lawyer-analyst and the psychiatrist-analyst were asked to review the
fifty-five casebooks' 0 independently, and to answer a prepared questionnaire for each case, containing both structured alternating and
open-ended questions.
One question asked of the analysts was: "Are there any issues
in this case between professional participants, including the judge?"
If they answered "yes," the analysts were then requested to enumerate
the issues, describing the positions taken by the participants.
Following the general open question on issues, both analysts
were asked to focus on: "Is there any disagreement among professional
participants regarding the dangerousness of this patient?" An affirmative answer raised the open-ended question "In what way?" If the
answer was negative, the analyst was asked: "Were the participants
agreed that the case is: dangerous, not dangerous, other ?" The analyst
was asked to be specific if he chose "other." However, since the
primary question permitted only an unqualified "yes" or "no" answer,
the "other" response was used by our analysts to express reservations,
qualifications or their inability to make a choice between different
answers. For example, one analyst answered that the participants
agreed the patient was dangerous and qualified the answer by adding
"if not treated." The difficulties in making a choice were expressed by
such an answer as "cannot say whether there is agreement or disagreement" (in that event the analyst refrained from choosing between
9. The lawyer-analyst was Dr. Malachy Mahon, Professor of Law and Dean of
Hofstra Law School, and former Staff Director of the Special Committee of the New
York City Bar Association on the study of commitment procedures and the law
relating to incompetents. The psychiatrist-analyst was Dr. Henry Pinsker, M.D.,
Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine and
Psychiatrist in Charge of In-Patient Psychiatric Service, Beth Israel Medical Center.
10. For each case a casebook was prepared comprised of the three sets of court
materials: the hearing transcript, the two-PC and the MHIS report. Minor editing
was done in order to conceal the identities of the participants in the hearings. In this
article, each of the cases is identified by its casebook number.
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a "yes" or a "no" answer). The "other" response also contained a
finding by one analyst that the question of dangerousness was "not
alluded to during the hearing." A response such as "dangerous if
not treated" was re-coded by us as "dangerous" and the rest of the
responses were categorized into "not clear" and "question is not raised."
FINDINGS

As noted before, our two analysts went over the same material independently. We surmised that if both analysts indicated the existence
of a certain "dispute" from the same data, we would have objective
findings, free from possible professional bias. Otherwise, differences
in their judgment would furnish us with clues to explore differences
in approach inherent in their respective professions.
In Table 1, issues pointed out by both the analysts or by either
analyst alone are listed. In categorizing issues, we concentrated on
summarizing findings of our analysts in brief but concrete terms.
Admittedly, descriptions of some issues, especially those listed at M
through R, are less concrete than the rest, but we could not subdivide
them further without losing the theme common to several "disputes."
These "disputes" involved conceptual, definitional and attitudinal differences between lawyers and psychiatrists.
A first glance at Table 1 reveals considerable judgmental discrepancies between our two analysts. Our lawyer-analyst alone tended
to see issues among the professional participants on legal matters and
"abnormal" behavior aspects, whereas our psychiatrist-analyst alone
tended to see issues in the therapeutic area. It is possible that these
discrepancies were largely the result of differences in professional training of the analysts (for instance, it is natural that a lawyer would be
more sensitive to legal rules of evidence). This aspect, however, will
be further examined in the course of this article.
Dangerousness

Even though the stated statutory criterion for civil commitment in
New York is merely that the mentally ill person be "suitable for care
and treatment"'1 in an institution, the dangerousness of that person to
11. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72(1) (McKinney 1971). Although
the statute does not directly make "dangerousness" of the mentally ill person a
criterion for commitment, it does state that a "harmless" patient may be released by

the court to the care and custody of his relatives or a committee of his person.
Id. § 72(3). Also, if a judge refuses to authorize continued confinement of a mentally
ill person proven to be "dangerous" to himself or others, any person aggrieved thereby
may obtain a rehearing and review of such refusal. Id. § 74.
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himself or others plays an important role in the hearings on civil
commitment. 2
Surprisingly, there was not a single case among the fifty-five in
which both the analysts agreed upon the existence of an issue on dangerousness among professionals (Table 1). This phenomenon was
also evident in the apparent paucity of agreement between the analysts
on the issue of dangerousness even after their attention was focused
on that problem by our second question (Table 2). Even here, there
were only two cases in which both analysts agreed that an issue on
dangerousness existed among the professional participants. However,
we note that even the agreement on the existence of a dispute on dangerousness in two cases by both analysts was based on a conflicting
pattern of judgment. In Table 2, our psychiatrist-analyst alone saw
far more disputes among participants than did our lawyer-analyst
alone, while the latter placed more cases in the columns "not clear"
and "question is not raised." Our lawyer-analyst alone placed nine
cases in .he column headed "question is not raised." In eight of these
nine cases, the psychiatrist-analyst reported agreement among professional participants that the patient was "not dangerous," and, in
the ninth case, that the patient was "dangerous." This raised the
obvious question, how did our psychiatrist-analyst judge that the participants agreed whether the patient was "dangerous" or "not dangerous" in cases in which the lawyer-analyst believed the question was
not even raised. For an answer we took a close look at the casebooks.
In case 22, our psychiatrist-analyst found an agreement among
the participants that the patient was "dangerous," while according
to our lawyer-analyst the "question [was] not raised." In both the
two-PC and the MHIS report on the case, there were allegations that
the patient had fought with his brother with a knife on the day of
his admission. Other than the lawyer's question, "Has he assaulted
anyone on the ward?" and the psychiatrist's answer "no," there was
no dialogue at the court hearing between the participants on the matter of "dangerousness." In view of this, our lawyer-analyst reported
that the question was "not specifically alluded to during hearing."
That our lawyer-analyst relied only on the testimony presented
at the hearings became clearer in other cases. For instance, in case 45,
page 4 of the MHIS report read "the doctor states that while she
is not dangerous, she would not be able to care for herself." The
hearing transcript for this case was brief and the question of danger-

26

12. See Kumasaka, Stokes & Gupta, Criteria of Involuntary Hospitalization,
399 (1972).

ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY
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ousness was never raised or touched upon by either participant. While
our psychiatrist-analyst deduced from this that the participants agreed
the patient was "not dangerous," our lawyer-analyst reported the
question "not discussed at hearing (but see MHIS report p. 4)."
Similarly in case 29., the two-PC states: "On the day of admission, she started a fire in her apartment." The two-PC does not
reveal the source of this information. But the MHIS report relates:
"The patient stated that on the day she was admitted to the hospital,
fire accidentally broke out in her apartment, which she attempted to
put out by filling the bathroom hamper with water and throwing it on
the floor, until the firemen arrived." Again, there was no attempt by
either participant to clarify the incident during the hearing. Based on
this, our psychiatrist-analyst felt that the participants agreed that the
patient was "not dangerous," while our lawyer-analyst reported that
the question was not raised.
Attitudinal differences on the reliability of "evidence" and different levels of factual interpretation appeared to exist between the
two analysts. The latter was clearly seen in case 18. In that case, there
was no material in either the two-PC, the MHIS report or the hearing transcript relating to "dangerousness," but the patient was an
eighty-one-year-old blind, incontinent and physically feeble man with a
diagnosis of senile dementia. Even in the absence of any statement by
either participant, our psychiatrist-analyst "assumed" that the participants agreed on the "harmlessness" of this old and feeble man. But
the lawyer-analyst merely pointed out that the question was not raised.
However, if it appears that the psychiatrist-analyst was "assuming" more than the lawyer-analyst, it would be hard to account for the
fact that the lawyer-analyst saw "agreement" among the participants
(Table 2) in more cases than his psychiatrist colleague. Except in
cases 21 and 47, the lawyer-analyst found agreement on dangerousness
among participants, in various ways, in all of the cases [totalling sixteen] in which the psychiatrist-analyst had judged that the issue existed.
If two persons, given the same material, report contradictory findings one indicating agreement and the other disagreement - the obvious
reason would seem to be that the one finding the agreement is trying
to "read" between the lines in order to resolve an apparent dispute.
However, in the instant case, a closer look at the casebooks revealed
answers other than the obvious.
The dialogue between lawyer and psychiatrist took the form of
the attorney cross-examining the doctor. The cross-examination was
sometimes routine, undertaken to qualify the stated opinion or to con-
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fine its implications; on the other hand, it was occasionally carried out
to join an issue and establish different viewpoints. The following
excerpts from the hearing transcripts of the cases illustrate the point.
Case 27
DOCTOR:

. . . He was brought to Roosevelt [Hospital]

because he felt that various people, including neighbors and his
girlfriend, were members of the C.I.A., and he was threatening
to assault the neighbors, and he did on occasion assault his girlfriend. When he arrived on the ward he was very angry, continually hostile, felt that everyone was against him, felt that
there were agents of the C.I.A. all over the place; he used obscene
language demanding immediate discharge, threatened to injure
and kill various members of the personnel, including his own
doctor, myself, the charge nurse and also before coming into the
hospital he went into a bank demanding ten million dollars and
threatened to kill the manager of the bank, which was denied
by him ....

I think there is very real possibility of his injuring or

hurting somebody else, perhaps even killing them. ...
JUDGE:

Do you wish to ask the doctor any question?

LAWYER: Yes, I have a few questions. Doctor, has the
patient actually assaulted anyone while on the ward to your
knowledge?
DOCTOR:

No, he hasn't.

LAWYER: In other words, as far as you know, his only
potential danger has been limited to verbal threats?
DOCTOR:
JUDGE:
question.
DOCTOR:

Yes, but could I elaborate on that?
We will give you a chance again. Just answer the
All right. No, he hasn't.

Although the psychiatrist-analyst felt that the lawyer was challenging
the opinion of the psychiatrist, the lawyer-analyst saw agreement
among the parties on "dangerousness" of the patient. The MHIS
lawyer intended in the cross-examination to qualify the extent of the
patient's dangerousness, but not to deny it. Familiarity with lawyers'
examination procedures would certainly enable our lawyer-analyst to
"guess" with greater accuracy than the psychiatrist-analyst the intent
of the MHIS lawyer. By the same token, in another situation, it is
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possible that our psychiatrist-analyst was better able to "read" the
testimony of psychiatrists than his lawyer-colleague."3
Generally, the lawyer began his cross-examination on the matter
of "dangerousness" by asking the psychiatrist whether the patient was
assaultive or not. And the psychiatrist usually replied with qualifications, such as: "While on the ward, no"; or with reservations, such as:
"I don't think, in general, but in a general sense we are not using the
word 'assaultive' in the sense that she wants to fight with people
physically, but she will fight with them verbally. Unless she gets what
she wants, what would she do next?" (Case 34). In case 51, definitional differences between the lawyer, the judge and the psychiatrist
became much clearer.
Case 51
JUDGE: Well, she came in on April 27th. How many
times approximately would you say you saw her since April 27th?
DOCTOR: Formally, I have seen her, I would say, sitting
down in an interview with her, I would say I have seen her about
five times. Informally, I see her all of the time. She walks into
my office all the time, demands to be discharged. Otherwise, she
would blow the place apart. She has threatened to harm me
sometimes.
PATIENT:

Doctor, you are full of baloney.

LAWYER:

Has she been destructive on the ward?

DOCTOR:

Because of her inappropriateness.

JUDGE: She has no record of her harming or injuring
any human being, has she?
DOCTOR:

No.

JUDGE: And she has no criminal record, there is no criminal record of any kind; any violations of law of any respect, violent
or otherwise?
DOCTOR:

Not that I know.

LAWYER:

Doctor, has she been destructive on the ward?

DOCTOR:

Yes, she has.

13. Psychiatrists are, in general, uneasy with cross-examination, in part, perhaps,
because of a lack of knowledge as to its purpose. One psychiatrist expressed her
feeling in case 30 by saying ". . . I do resent this sort of questioning when the
lawyer knows perfectly well what the answers to the questions are."
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In what way?

DOCTOR: We are getting repetitious. She did throw off
her own clothes, she has thrown books around, she has ripped
booksCases 10 and 30 present a different situation in the matter of
"dangerousness."
Case 10
LAWYER:

Do you consider her dangerous to other people

in an assaultive fashion? Has she ever assaulted patients in the
ward?
DOCTOR: She did not. She had aggressive tendency in
the ward. She is a very nice and peaceful person, but when you
are dealing with a paranoid person you never know how she will
react, when she is seventy-five years old, what would she do. In
a case when we are dealing with a paranoid patient who fears
that "some people are against me, and to prevent this I will attack
them before they will be against me."
Case 30
LAWYER: I'm aware of that, Dr. X. The point is that
you testified that the symptoms were irreversible, the disease is
irreversible. Do you consider this man dangerous?
DOCTOR: To himself, yes, he is ruining himself. Didn't
he come in just a month ago, an acute alcoholic toxic with gastritis and bleeding and in a very bad paranoid state when he was
under his own care, and supervision implemented by very intensive coverage at the Fountain House, and he couldn't make it?
If you want to take him home and take care of him, feel free.
I am wondering about this case what would happen to himIn cases 34, 51, 10 and 30, quoted above, the psychiatrist-analyst
saw the existence of an issue but the lawyer-analyst saw agreement
among participants that the patients were "not dangerous." In these
cases, there seems to be a definitional and conceptual disagreement, if
not a "dispute" among the professional participants on "dangerousness." However, our lawyer-analyst would be correct if all the participants, including the psychiatrists, shared a common definition of
"dangerousness" as "directly and seriously assaultive or suicidal,"
the frame of reference evidently maintained by all participating lawyers
and our lawyer-analyst. New York State's Mental Hygiene Law does
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not define "dangerousness." 14 Therefore, any apparent agreement within the legal profession on the definition of "dangerousness" is not in
conformity with any statutory definition but is a working definition.
However, it is not correct to assume that lawyers accept "dangerousness" as encompassing only physical danger. For instance, our lawyeranalyst saw agreement that the patient was dangerous in case 27,
mentioned above, in which the acknowledged problem was mere "verbal
threats" although the patient had reportedly assaulted his girlfriend.
Case 12 offered an even better example.
Case 12
LAWYER: Now, Doctor, in the absence of any actual
injury to himself or others, on what basis - first of all, would
you say that there is any likelihood of any dangerousness to
himself or others?
DOCTOR: I would say that there would be a likelihood of
both, although primarily injury to others would be what one would
expect.
LAWYER:

On what basis do you say that?

DOCTOR: The basis for this is that the ideas of persecution in this sort of patient, and in this patient's case particularly,
are very strongly held and proved resistant to all argumentation.
Clearly, the patient has already attempted to confront his supposed persecutor. It is only a small step from there to making
the confrontation a violent one, and such things have very frequently happened in the course of such a disease as this where the
idea of persecution is fixed as to theme and constant in its presentation. So that I think the index of suspicion of potential violence
here would be quite high.
LAWYER:

I have no further questions of the Doctor.

Our lawyer-analyst felt that the cross-examining lawyer agreed
with the psychiatrist, whereas our psychiatrist-analyst felt that they
14. There is only one place in article 5 of the Mental Hygiene Law, relating to
hospitalization of the mentally ill, where "dangerousness" is at all elaborately described.
Section 85, dealing with proceedings for certification to Matteawan State Hospital of
certain dangerous mentally ill patients of state hospitals, states: "Such physicians, if
satisfied, after a personal examination, that such patient has committed or is liable to
commit an act or acts which if committed by a sane person would constitute homicide
or felonious assault, or is so dangerously mentally ill that his presence in such hospital
is dangerous to the safety of other patients therein, the officers or employees thereof,
or to the community, shall make a certificate to such effect." N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW § 85(1) (McKinney 1971) (emphasis added).
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disagreed; The difference between psychiatric and legal professionals
on the matter of "dangerousness," then, is not really so much a question of how one interprets "assaultiveness," but of how short one
perceives the distance between thought and action or, as this testifying
psychiatrist put it, how high "the index of suspicion of potential
violence" is.
In cases 53 and 14, both analysts agreed upon the existence of
the "issue."
Case 53
LAWYER:

. . . Doctor, do you have any information

which would lead you to believe that the patient has ever or
would ever physically hurt himself or others?
DOCTOR:

Yes, I do.

LAWYER:

What information is that?

DOCTOR: One day when I was talking to him about
asking him what had happened to him in November, what had
happened to him in Kings County, he became anxious and he
stood up and he said, "No, I'm not going to talk about this.
Something bad will happen, someone will get hurt if I talk
about this."
LAWYER: But, do you have any information that he
ever struck anybody or cut his wrists or made a suicidal gesture?
DOCTOR: No, but I think he was angry, and the reason
that he was nervous was he was afraid he was going to hurt me.
JUDGE:

He was, what?

DOCTOR:
JUDGE:

He was afraid he was going to hurt me.
Hurt you?

DOCTOR:

Yes.

Case 14
JUDGE: Doctor, in your opinion, if she is released will
she be a danger to herself or to the community?
DOCTOR: I think so, your Honor. That is my only reason for recommending this [hospitalization].
LAWYER:

On what basis, Doctor?

DOCTOR: On the basis of this what I call chip on her
shoulder, on the basis of her paranoia, and the fact that, you
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know, she will tell you, for instance, that people were playing a
rock record in an effort to kill her. And she will tell you thatLAWYER:

She never told me this.

DOCTOR:

Well, she told me this.

LAWYER:

It's not in the record.

DOCTOR:
you have.
LAWYER:
DOCTOR:

I have talked to her, I suspect, longer than
Is it in the record?
Not everything is in the record.

LAWYER:
and others?

Is it in the record that she is dangerous to self

DOCTOR:

Well, I think the implication is in the record.

LAWYER:

No, it is not in the record.

DOCTOR: Well, I think it is in the record. I guess it depends on how you read a record.
LAWYER: Will you give me an incident of the time that
she either assaulted physically or in some other way injured another person?
DOCTOR: Here is something from the record that I think
indicates some of the problems: she says that people are playing
tricks on her with her money, her clothes, and so forth.
LAWYER:

What date is that, Doctor?

DOCTOR: That is the [date]. I think that there isn't
any question that the woman is a paranoid schizophrenic. I think
that how dangerous she is is a matter of judgment, which the
more you attempt toLAWYER:

I am asking you for a strict judgment.

DOCTOR: But I say living with her - well, as strict as I
know how - because I think sometimes the more literal you are,
the more you escape essentials.
LAWYER:
the Court.

Dangerousness has a certain meaning before

DOCTOR: [To the patient] You tell me if this is true or
not. If you had heard her screaming and marching up and down
and threatening everyone on the ward, then you would begin to
know that she is a risk in the community, that even when she
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came back from this walk, or when she discusses this outing
that you would have the impression that she is a risk.
LAWYER: Doctor, excuse me, but we discussed this at
length. I didn't note either intense anger or any other intense
emotional reaction. She described the situation to me, which
happens in this city a thousand times a day. I am not able to,
and I don't think you are able to, say it didn't happen.
DOCTOR: No, and I haven't said it. I have said that on
the ward in my observation she has had intense anger expressed
[To the patient] Is that correct?
at times. Even yesterday ....
When you were talking to me?
PATIENT: She insists that I need psychiatric treatment.
I said to her: how can she know what's down here and what's
up here. I have been with mental treatment when I went to
the hospitalFunctioning
"Functioning" may be used to describe either mental or social
behavior. Functioning on the mental level, in terms of intellectual
performance, emotional stability and the like, may affect occupational
and interpersonal performance. Poor performance, however, may
equally well result from such non-psychiatric causes as the general
employment situation, racial or social bias and so forth. The double
meaning of functioning sometimes creates an issue in the court.
Although the testifying psychiatrist in case 14 indicated that
dangerousness was her only reason for recommending hospitalization,
her disagreement with the lawyer over "functioning" (Table 1) was
also pointed out by both analysts.
Case 14
DOCTOR: It was on the basis of this that I finally had
to draw the conclusion that she is not ready to function in the
community on her own.
LAWYER:

What is that conclusion based on?

DOCTOR: Well, I will give you one example. We have
many. Even on the ward where the patient has a chip on her
shoulder so large that it reaches quite across to anyone she comes
in contact with. But on a pass, a recent pass, she was out with a
group. They went to the Manhattan Zoo, and they were out in
the street. And a man was walking with his wife, and the patient
felt that he left his wife to brush against her.
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Do you know if this was his wife?

DOCTOR:
he was with.

She tells me that. I don't know. The woman

LAWYER:

She told you he was walking with a woman?

DOCTOR: Yes. In any case, that he left that woman to
come and brush against her. She felt that it was deliberate. She
felt where he touched her and how he touched her was rather
a deliberate attempt to violate, or whatever she feels are the
proprieties.
LAWYER:

Do you know that this was not true?

DOCTOR: I know that the other members of the group
felt this was not the case, yes. And I know that in contact after
contact on the ward of the patient's starting with a small kernel
of reality and building up a fantasy that is colossal.
LAWYER: You make these statements, Doctor, but you
don't give me an adequate ground for them.
DOCTOR:

Well, I am sorry.

LAWYER: The fact that she was with people, the man
brushed against her, and that other people concluded that this
was not meant to violate her, or it was not meant in any fashion
whatsoever is arguable on either side.
DOCTOR: All right. I would say that in the daytime in
New York City that if it happened just as she describes it, her
response was still highly inappropriate. The excitement and the
injury and the enormous anger that she felt would have been
inappropriate had it truly occurred as she describes it.
LAWYER:
tirely subjectiveJUDGE:

I think this is a matter of conjecture and en-

Counsel, please limit yourself to questions.

LAWYER:

All right, Sir ....

Doctor, is it true that this

lady asked you if she could obtain a position and go out from
the hospital?
DOCTOR:

Yes.

LAWYER:

And-

DOCTOR: I felt when I let her go out on pass, I was
hoping she might be ready to start work. Several of our patients
have from the ward. But after observing her behavior on the
ward-
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After this incident you mean?

DOCTOR: This one plus others. There are many on the
ward, but this was out of the ward. But I felt that she wasn't
ready to go back to work.
Case 10
LAWYER: Is there any limitation to this lady's psychosis,
to what area is this confined? Could you give an example?
DOCTOR:
LAWYER:
of idea?

Mainly preoccupied with paranoid ideas.
That's generally, but specifically what kind

DOCTOR: As I mentioned before, she thought she was
being gassed here, she thought she was being gassed, that people
are laughing at her, that people are watching her from the opposite
side of the street.

LAWYER: When she tells you this and you have seen her
and on interviews when she tells you this, does she look particularly frightened?

DOCTOR:

No.

LAWYER:

And she doesn't get angry?

DOCTOR:

No.

LAWYER: In other words, she has these ideas but goes
on generally living her life pretty much the same, except that
she has these ideas?
DOCTOR:

Yes.

In both these cases, the judgment of the psychiatrists on the
ability of the patient to function in social and occupational spheres was
based on their evaluation that "illness" was present. In case 14, the
lawyer disagreed with the conclusion of the psychiatrist because of
the heavy reliance on "subjective" judgment by the latter, and in case
10, the lawyer insisted on the limited impact of the patient's "illness"
on her daily life.
When a patient's difficulty manifests itself on the behavioral level
or in such events in his daily life as becoming unemployed, which may
be plausibly explained by situational or social circumstances, there is
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a question as to what extent psychiatric illness is responsible for
these difficulties.
Case 13
JUDGE:
doesn't eat.

Well, that is the issue, whether he eats, or

LAWYER:
No, sir, not a question on that issue. It's a
question of lassitude. If I may ask the doctor, does anemia result
in lassitude?
DOCTOR: This is true. Now, he has anemia, nutritional
anemia. Now, another circumstantial fact, he was living alone, and
the sister says he stays home and doesn't even go out shopping,PATIENT:

I go out shopping.

DOCTOR: He stays in the ward and does nothing, remains
in seclusion. Now, one more thing, we call him schizophrenic.
The basic thing of schizophrenia [is] autistic tendency.
LAWYER:
to do-

Has any prior psychiatric disease anything

DOCTOR: Well, there is something before psychiatric admission. I have added that I guess he has been out of work for
two years and according to the sister, the information, that I
suspect he has been this way at least in the last two years.
LAWYER: Do you have any idea of the date of onset of
the anemia due to the inhalation of sulphur fumes of where he
worked? Do you know how long that was?
DOCTOR:

I have no idea. I can't make a guess about it.

LAWYER:

You don't know that it was two years ago?

DOCTOR:

No.

LAWYER:

Well, it was two years ago.

JUDGE:

You said he was out of work for two years?

LAWYER: Your Honor, this man was employed in a plant
where they used some sort of chemicals.
JUDGE:

Yes, I see that now in the report.

LAWYER: Which resulted in a blood disclosure [dyscrasia]. We are not claiming that his condition was due entirely
to anemia but certainly his mother was informed that he was
anemic ...
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In this case, the lawyer's position was clearly expressed in her
closing remarks to the court: "We don't have any more questions.
The only thing, we request the court to consider discharging this
gentleman so there can be an attempt to live in the community and to
function. If he cannot, the worst that can possibly happen to society
is that he be returned."
The lawyer's attempt in case 11, which follows, to suggest reasons other than psychiatric "illness" that would explain the patient's
situation and conduct, was in sharp conflict with the psychiatrist, who
attributed those same facts to "illness." In this case, the patient left
Chicago rather abruptly and came to New York City, where she was
stranded and wandered around Grand Central Station for three
months. She was eventually brought to Bellevue by police who picked
her up for vagrancy. The lawyer suggested that the patient fled
Chicago because her daughter was making an effort to hospitalize her,
whereas the psychiatrist felt differently.
LAWYER: And then at the age of sixty-one she came to
New York rather suddenly; is that correct?
DOCTOR: Yes. She was running away from assassins
who were trying to kill her in Chicago.
LAWYER: Whatever the reasons she told you when she
came in, she did come to New York City, and to your knowledge
she had no resources or any place that was prearranged to live; is
that correct?
DOCTOR: That's inaccurate. She had no place to live
because she doesn't arrange and doesn't plan ahead.
JUDGE:

Because what?

DOCTOR: Because she doesn't plan ahead. So she had no
resources. But actually she has an income of - she had a small
income, I think a thousand dollars a year, for some years, and
her daughter was willing to send her forty dollars a week when
they could find her. But she often gave addresses at which she
no longerLAWYER: When you say the patient doesn't plan ahead,
how do you explain her successful living alone in Chicago all
these years?
DOCTOR: I don't think it was very successful. As I say,
I think she has gotten worse. But I don't think her living for
many years was successful.
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LAWYER: Is it possible that she came to New York without resources and without planning ahead and that being in a
strange city with no place to go would have put her suddenly
in the condition you saw her in when she came to the hospital?
DOCTOR: I think it certainly aggravated the condition.
But I think this will happen again. I think she will more and
more get in this condition if left to her own resources at this point.
LAWYER: If she made contact with the Welfare agency
and said she herself would be willing to take Welfare funds and
find a place in New York, could you make a judgment about her
ability to live on this basis somewhat as she lived in Chicago?
DOCTOR: I think she isn't able at this time, and I will
give you an example. We had a trip going out about two weeks
ago. The patients often go out on trips in small groups. Four
or five of them were going to the Zoo and the Frick Museum,
and I thought the patient might enjoy the Frick Museum. She
told me she hates zoos, and I could understand that. And I said,
"What about the Frick?" She said, "I really can't go out, because if I were to walk up Fifth Avenue and people were to see
me, everyone knows me and something would happen."
JUDGE:
DOCTOR:

And something?
"And something would happen."

Our two analysts suggested that in the above case, both the
testifying psychiatrist and the lawyer considered the patient "not dangerous." The testifying psychiatrist implied that this patient would
again run away from the supposed assassins who were trying to kill her
in New York City, and would again put herself in the same "emaciated
and disheveled" condition (from the two-PC) as she was when brought
to Bellevue.
Purpose of Hospitalization
Psychiatric hospitalization is not always recommended for the
sake of the patient alone. Rightly or wrongly, hospitalization is frequently sought for the sake of others, such as family or society. Disputes between lawyers and psychiatrists often arise over the purpose of
the hospitalization.
In case 11, noted above, the psychiatrist's testimony, attributing
to the patient the words "and something would happen," reflected her
concern for the patient's welfare. In other cases, testifying psychiatrists
expressed concern not about the patients themselves, but about possible
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harm to others. For instance, in case 10, the psychiatrist stated: "She
is a very nice and peaceful person, but when you are dealing with a
paranoid person you never know how she will react. . .

."

In case 53,

the psychiatrist expressed her apprehension by referring to the patient's
statement: "No, I'm not going to talk about this. Something bad will
happen, someone will get hurt if I talk about this." The lawyer in case
13, as mentioned earlier, recommended the discharge of a seclusive and
inactive patient, summarizing her position: "If he cannot [function
in the community], the worst that can possibly happen to society is
that he be returned." Both the analysts found agreement among the
participants that the patient was "not dangerous." The testifying
psychiatrist, however, was apparently recommending hospitalization
for the protection of the patient.
Attitudinal differences between psychiatrists and lawyers over
"hospitalization for the protection of the patient" were clearly reflected
in case 31.
LAWYER: Now, if she were on a course of medication and
this were given with regularity, would you think that her condition might improve in, say, two months, three months?
DOCTOR: I think it's really, more or less, stabilized at a
level that she is in now.
LAWYER:

You don't expect any changes in that case?

DOCTOR: I don't expect any remarkable change. Change
is a relative matter and percentagewise I can't estimate the particular amount, but I think she is stabilized, let's put it that way,
around this level.
LAWYER:
her, then?

Is there any particular value to confinement for

DOCTOR: Only insofar as poor judgment and poor reality
testing, she may get into a situation which may be provocative
somewhere on the outside; other than that, I don't know.
LAWYER: You are aware, however, that this last time
she came in with her sister. She said she had spent one month
in the Y State Hospital also when brought by her sister. She
has never really had any sort of problem with strangers.
DOCTOR: The fact that something hasn't happened in
the past does not preclude its happening in the future.
In that case, the psychiatrist expected no additional improvement
in the patient to result from further hospitalization. In the following
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case, a somewhat different situation existed. As noted earlier, the
lawyer and the psychiatrist had also disagreed over the dangerousness
of the patient.
Case 30
LAWYER: I'm aware of that, Dr. X. The point is that
you testified that the symptoms were irreversible, the disease is
irreversible. Do you consider this man dangerous?
DOCTOR: To himself, yes . . . If you want to take him
home and take care of him, feel free. I am wondering about this
case, what would happen to him-

LAWYER: Is it the consensus that among other doctors,
in that, confining him is the answer? Is that the consensus that
conforms to the record?
DOCTOR:

If you want to look it over?

LAWYER: Your Honor, this is a very relevant question
when this man's liberty is at stake.
DOCTOR: Being away from toxic substances is sometimes
the only way one can avoid being made ill by those toxic substances.
LAWYER: In other words then, this patient would have
to be permitted to live in the hospital for life? That would keep
him away from toxic substances.
JUDGE:

There is no such testimony.

LAWYER: Doctor, you just testified to it. Is that right,
doctor, that sometimes the only way to keep people away from
toxic substances is to hospitalize them.
DOCTOR: If you had sutures after surgery would you
appreciate very much being discharged, or would you like to be
given half a chance for full recovery, or at least fully recoverable
until you are capable, that's all I'm asking.
LAWYER:
JUDGE:

I want to ask one more question.

Go ahead. You haven't been curbed.

LAWYER: No, I think this is a good case on the doctor's
own statements. Doctor, has this man inflicted any type of injury
on himself ?
DOCTOR:

Yes, constantly.

LAWYER:

When?
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DOCTOR: Every time he refused to take medication, and
going to keep himLAWYER:

No, let's limit-

DOCTOR:

No, let's not limit. Let's deal with the realities.

LAWYER:
the questions.

Doctor, I would appreciate your answering

DOCTOR: Yes. What do you think gave him alcoholic
gastritis and impended D.T.'s. This isn't an injury inflicted on
oneself ? It can develop into brain damage, seizures, no one knows.
This was self-indulged.
Marked animosity between the lawyer and the psychiatrist complicated that court hearing. The testifying psychiatrist equated protection with hospitalization and also implied therapeutic gain would
result from hospitalization by using the analogy of recovery from surgery. The psychiatrist's viewpoint was bitterly challenged by the
lawyer. Going back to case 14, the testifying psychiatrist's assertion
of therapeutic gain from hospitalization was questioned by the lawyer
in that case as well.
LAWYER: Doctor, you are aware that this lady, after an
early hospitalization in 1961DOCTOR:

No, there is a '58 one here.

LAWYER: '58 to '61 for eight years after that she was
continuously employed and had no admission to any hospital.
DOCTOR:

That's right.

LAWYER:

What would you conclude from that?

DOCTOR: I would conclude that she has a potential for
reorganization, which I obviously concluded because for a month
I was attempting to help the patient to reorganize sufficiently, to
go out. Now, I don't think, if you look into her adjustment, that
it was ideal, but I don't expect that. I think that she will reorganize and go out of the hospital again. This is aLAWYER: Well, Doctor, what is ideal? If an individual is
continuously employed, and even if - I don't say that that's true,
but even if she has some mental problem, she is continuously
employed and in eight years requires no hospitalization, certainly
she has considerable powers of concentration.
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DOCTOR: She does, and she has considerable powers to
be a contributing member of the community. At this time she is
not able to use them.
LAWYER: Now, her most recent hospitalization - and
I am not including Bellevue - was at the Bronx [State Hospital]
for two months?
DOCTOR:

Yes.

LAWYER: Did you know that while she was at Bronx
Hospital she was permitted to go out of the hospital and to return
to classes ?
DOCTOR: She was here too. I permitted her to go out.
It was on the basis of this that I finally had to draw the conclusion
that she is not ready to function in the community on her own. 5
In both cases, 30 and 14, the participating lawyers were apparently suggesting that the patients had gained maximum benefit from
hospitalization and further improvement could not realistically be
expected.
Benefit of Doubt
Eventually, toward the end of the hearing in case 14, the testifying psychiatrist and the presiding judge entered into an exchange of
therapeutic philosophies of sorts.
JUDGE: [to the patient] Now, I am releasing you. I
think you need care. As to whether or not the care should be
of a custodial nature at the present time, I am not sure. I will
be frank with you. But I am giving you the benefit of the doubt.
Do you follow?
PATIENT:
JUDGE:

But if you find that you do need care, come back.

PATIENT:
JUDGE:

Yes.
Yes.

All right.

LAWYER:

Thank you, your Honor.

DOCTOR: May I say one other thing, your Honor? That
I think this question - I have heard a Judge on one occasion
15. The testimony referring to incidents outside the hospital, while the patient
was permitted to go out, is cited earlier in the text. See pp. 21-23 supra.
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say to a patient, "I am going to let you go, but I don't want
you to hear voices." That was the extreme. You see, I don't
think the benefit of doubt always is not to get care. I think the
benefit of the doubt for many patients may be actually to get the
care when it is needed.
JUDGE: Well, absolutely. So I think that I am trying to
give her the benefit of the doubt that would be the best for her too.
DISCUSSION

Out of a total of fifty-five cases, thirty-one were found by either
or both of the analysts to contain "issues" among professional participants. In the remaining twenty-four cases, neither analyst found any
issue of conflict among the professionals. We may conclude from this
that these twenty-four cases were probably presented to .the court only
because of unresolved problems between the psychiatrist and the
patient. However, we will not explore this factor because our focus
in this article is only on "issues" among professional participants
inside the courtroom.
Our qualitative inquiry into the hearing materials, steered by the
two independent analysts, revealed a number of definitional, conceptual
and attitudinal differences between lawyers and psychiatrists. However, it is not clear to what extent these perceived differences were the
result of the built-in rules and procedures of a court hearing itself
rather than the product of the opinions and views on civil commitment
espoused by the two professions.
As noted earlier, New York State's Mental Hygiene Law does
not specifically define the concept of "dangerousness.'
As to the
criteria for commitment, the statute simply states: "If it be determined
that the patient is mentally ill and in need of retention for care and
treatment, the court shall forthwith issue an order authorizing the
retention of such patient for care and treatment in the hospital ....- "
The concepts of "mental illness" and "care and treatment" are statutorily defined as follows: "A 'mentally ill person' means any person
afflicted with mental disease to such an extent that for his own welfare or the welfare of others, or of the community, he requires care
and treatment;""8 " '[c] are and treatment' means medical care, surgical attendance, nursing and medications, as well as food, clothing
16. See note 14 supra.

17. N.Y.

MENTAL

18. Id. § 2(8).

HYGIENE LAW

§ 72(3) (McKinney 1971).
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,"19 These statutory
and maintenance, furnished to a patient ...
definitions are apparently too broad and do not appear to restrict the
opinions and views expressed by the participants in the hearings.
It is possible that the procedure of the Bellevue Court could
have affected some of our findings. The hearings dealt only with
involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill. The testifying psychiatrist, not assisted by counsel in presenting the hospital's case, was
forced to recommend hospitalization for one reason or another. Within this limitation, a psychiatrist could still have tried to maintain the
position of "expert witness," simply informing the court concerning
mental illness of the patient and presenting pros and cons of hospitalization. However, in the particular setting, it was very difficult.
The lawyers were present to represent the patients, but they found
themselves in a much more flexible position than the psychiatrists. A
lawyer could be representing the "patient's interest," which would
usually have meant "discharge," or representing the "best interest" of
the patient, which may indeed have meant hospitalization in the personal judgment of the counselor. The absence of an issue among
professional participants in many cases indicated that the lawyer had
not infrequently assumed the position of judge, not advocate. Nevertheless, the Bellevue Court is, on the whole, still adversary in procedure,
frequently forcing the professional participants to assume positions of
"prosecutor" and "defender."
On the other hand, it may be argued that the procedure did not
minimize differences in such substantive areas as the relevancy of
"abnormal" behavior to the determination that "mental illness" was
present. Psychiatrists here microscopically scrutinize unusual behavior,
emphasizing "mental illness," whereas lawyers try to limit the relevance of unusual behavior, explaining it away in terms of everyday experience. It is noteworthy that our lawyer-analyst saw more of
an issue on "abnormal" behavior among participants than his psychiatrist counterpart (Table 1). In the cases pointed out by our lawyeranalyst, judges and lawyers were essentially asking the psychiatrists
what "inappropriate affect" is. Who isn't illogical, and who is not
bizarre at times, they seemed to be asking. Disagreement which
reached the proportions of an "issue" or point of debate on this matter
was most clearly seen in case 51, noted by both analysts.
JUDGE:
DOCTOR:
19. Id. § 2(6).

Is she hostile?
Yes, and she is laughing.
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When she is hostile, she is not violent?

DOCTOR: No, she threatens to blow the whole place up,
and then calms down. We had to put her in seclusion on several
occasions, and she acts strange at times.
JUDGE: Doctor, would you agree that there are a great
many people walking around in the streets - many, many I'm now looking at your report, and starting with the first descriptive word: ".

.

. the patient is irrelevant . . ." Will you agree

with me that there are an awful lot of people walking around the
street who are irrelevant?
DOCTOR:

Yes, but not in the hospital.
JUDGE: And, would you agree with the Court? The
Court will take judicial notice of the fact that there are many,
many people who are illogical? Would you agree?
DOCTOR: Yes, I will agree.
JUDGE:

The next one is ".

.

. incoherent

..

The same

thing by the Court, that there are many, many people incoherent;
right, you agree with that?
DOCTOR:
JUDGE:

Absolutely.
And, ".

.

. affect inappropriate .

. ."

a little am-

biguous to the Court, affect inappropriate. Could you explan that
to the Court ?

DOCTOR: Yes, inappropriate means that the facial expression of the patient doesn't agree with theJUDGE: Doesn't correspond to the nature of the feelings?
In other words, the patient may be saying a very sad story and
might be laughing? The facial expression doesn't correspond
with the story or with the words?
DOCTOR: Exactly. Well, you have seen her inappropriateness.
JUDGE: In other words, she wouldn't make a good actress? She wouldn't qualify on the stage to make a good actress?
DOCTOR: Maybe, she would, I don't know.
JUDGE: All right, the first adjective or description that I
found that might be pertinent is delusional and, of course, we go
to paranoidLAWYER: Perhaps, Doctor, if you explain to the judge
what - mention some bizarre activity or threatening activity on
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the ward. On what do you base your recommendation that she
needs further hospitalization, what acts, what statements has she
made, her conduct on the ward?
In that case, the judge's overt assault on psychiatry reflected the
confrontation of public conceptions of mental illness with the professional conception.20 Law professionals, part of the general public,
are less sensitive than psychiatrists to the concept of "abnormality."
They do not see behavior or events from the same perspective as
psychiatrists, either qualitatively or quantitatively. They are more
likely to seek plausible explanations for "psychotic" or "inappropriate" behavior. For example, confronted with hostility and belligerence exhibited in the ward, lawyers ask: "Who wouldn't be angry if
one is locked up against his will ?" However, on the whole, law professionals do not challenge psychiatrists' testimony as to absence or
presence of mental illness. Diagnosis was judged to be an "issue" in
only one case of the fifty-five, case 34, and in that, by our lawyeranalyst alone (Table 1). In that case, the lawyer had merely asked
whether or not the patient suffered from brain syndrome, since it had
been mentioned in the two-PC. Judges and lawyers did not go so
far as to make "diagnoses," though they could have challenged the
hospital's diagnosis by asking for an independent psychiatrist's evaluation of the patient's mental status. The two independent psychiatrists
who did appear in these hearings, however, joined "issues" with
Bellevue psychiatrists on the question of the further therapeutic benefit
of hospitalization, but not on "diagnosis."
In civil commitment, the problem is apparently not one of "digging out" abnormality, but of determining how overt it is. We might
borrow the phrase of the judge in case 51 in a different context: "the
first adjective or description that I found that might be pertinent [to
forced hospitalization] is .

.

."'

The judge had no difficulty under-

standing the words of the psychiatrist; he simply was not convinced
that the behavior described warranted confinement. In the process of
assessing the extent of "abnormality," loose interpretation of facts and
terms by psychiatrists comes under attack from law professionals.
Another factor which may affect attitudinal differences between
lawyers and psychiatrists, especially the apparently apprehensive and
20. See Dohrenwend, Bernard & Kolb, The Orientation of Leaders in an Urban
Area Toward Problems of Mental Illness, 118 AM. J. PSYcHIATRY 683 (1962);
The Public's Ideas About Mental Illness, Address by S. Star, Annual Meeting,
National Association for Mental Health, in Indianapolis, Ind., Nov. 5, 1955.
21. Emphasis added.
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protective attitude of psychiatrists towards patients, is that lawyers
do not share the burden of ultimate responsibility in discharging a
patient, whereas judges and psychiatrists do. It is true that psychiatrists shift this responsibility to the judge in the courtroom, but in
everyday practice, the responsibility is theirs. The lawyer, while participating in the decision-making process, is never charged with the
responsibility for an ultimate decision. The judge, also a lawyer by
profession, shares the responsibility with the psychiatrist, and is,
therefore, much more "conservative" in his judicial rulings than his
brother attorneys. In fact, the patient's chance of being released by
the psychiatrist in an out-of-court agreement is much greater than
in the courtroom. In part, perhaps, for this reason, lawyers appear
to make great efforts to settle the cases outside the courtroom.2 2
Active involvement of lawyers in the decision-making process
related to hospitalization of the mentally ill has barely begun in
American psychiatric practice. Lawyers are now learning the realities
of the equivocal and yet genuine problem of "mental illness." The
silence of the "defense" in many cases at the Bellevue Court may be
an indication that many patients indeed need "protection." However,
the question for both lawyers and psychiatrists is, how far do we go
in "patronizing" our clients or patients and how much more should we
know before we begin to impose our personal, or for that matter, professional values on patients.
22. See Gupta, supra note 8.

